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I. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2017, the Ninth Circuit caused significant disruptions in the 
Corporate Tax world by reversing the Tax Court’s decision in Altera 
Corp. v. Commissioner and finding that the Commissioner of the IRS 
could allocate income between related parties without a comparison to 
1
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what unrelated parties would do in similar circumstances.1 In an unusual 
turn of events, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion after the death of 
Judge Reinhardt, who was the deciding vote in Altera.2 This rare 
withdrawal of an opinion left many individuals eagerly waiting to see 
whether the Ninth Circuit would maintain its position or concur with the 
Tax Court on rehearing. 
Part II of this article explores how a corporation can take advantage 
of tax laws to reduce the amount of tax it owes and what government 
agencies can do to combat these tax avoidance tactics. Part III provides 
background on Xilinx v. Commissioner and examines the opinions of the 
Tax Court and Ninth Circuit in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner. Part IV 
analyzes Altera Corp. v. Commissioner against a backdrop of legislative 
and judicial history, arguing that the Ninth Circuit did not reach the 
correct outcome and explores the consequences of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision. Finally, Part V calls for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its 
opinion on rehearing and find that the Tax Court’s decision was correct.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Often, a U.S. Corporation is closely related to a legal entity in a 
different country, meaning the U.S. entity owns a large part of the 
foreign entity or they are both part of the same multinational 
corporation. In some instances, a U.S. Corporation can utilize a tactic 
called transfer pricing, allowing the U.S. Corporation to shift expenses 
or profits to a related entity in a country with a lower tax-rate, and 
thereby avoid paying taxes in the United States.3 One example of this 
tactic is the transfer of intangible property, and therefore the profits 
associated with that intangible property, to an entity in a country with 
lower tax rates than the United States.4 This means that the United 
 
 1. See Altera Corp. v Comm’r (Altera II), Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20524 at *4 (9th Cir. July 24, 2018).  
 2. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 898 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 3. Cf. David Leonhardt, The Big Companies That Avoid Taxes, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 
18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/opinion/the-big-companies-that-avoid-taxes.html (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2019) (explaining how companies like Amazon, Facebook, and Google pay less in 
corporate taxes by funneling profits through low tax countries). 
 4. See Xiaoying Zhang, The Valuation of Intellectual Property for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 
LANDSLIDE MAGAZINE (2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/2015-september-
october/ABA_LAND_v008n01__the_valuation_of_intellectual_property_for_transfer_pricing_purposes
.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) (explaining how drug manufacturer Pfizer avoided U.S. 
taxes by shifting intangible property to foreign subsidiary and then paying that subsidiary high licensing 
fees to offset U.S. profits).  
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States government is missing out on a significant source of income; 
some estimate the tax loss for the U.S. government is in excess of 180 
billion dollars per year stemming from the use of this tactic.5  
Google Inc. is a great example of a multinational corporation’s ability 
to reduce tax liability through shifting profits to different countries.6 In 
2010, Bloomberg News reported that Google’s overseas tax rate was 
2.4%.7 This is astonishing considering Google operates “mostly in high-
tax countries where the average corporate rate is well over 20%[,]” 
including the UK and the United States which had tax rates at the time 
of 28% and 35%, respectively.8 Google was able to reduce its tax rate 
and save roughly $3.1 billion dollars in taxes by shifting some of its 
profits to Bermuda, a country that imposes no tax on corporate profits.9 
Another opportunity to shift expenses and profits to different 
countries is through cost-sharing agreements. A United States 
corporation and its related entity can enter into cost-sharing agreements 
when collaborating on research and development projects together. The 
agreement will stipulate that the costs associated with the project will be 
shared between the parties in proportion to the benefit each party is 
expecting to receive from the project.10 A conflict can arise when 
determining whether certain intangibles, such as stock-based 
compensation, need to be included in the cost-sharing agreement. Stock-
based compensation is any compensation provided to an employee “in 
the form of equity instruments, options to acquire stock (stock options), 
or rights with respect to (or determined with reference to) equity 
instruments or stock options.”11  
B. The Department of the Treasury’s Ability to Allocate Income 
To combat the issue of tax avoidance through transfer pricing, the 
Department of the Treasury (“the Treasury”) enacted Section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (“Section 482”), which allows the Secretary of 
the Treasury (“the Secretary”) to allocate income or expenses between 
organizations controlled by the same interests if the Secretary 
 
 5. Niall McCarthy, Tax Avoidance Costs the U.S. Nearly $200 Billion Every Year, FORBES 
(Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/03/23/tax-avoidance-costs-the-u-s-
nearly-200-billion-every-year-infographic/#1a3853e12f0d (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).  
 6. Jesse Drucker, Move cuts Google Tax Rate to 2.4%, BLOOMBERG NEWS (October 22, 2010). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.; Bermuda Corporate – Taxes on Corporate Income, PWC WORLDWIDE TAX SUMMARIES, 
http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Bermuda-Corporate-Taxes-on-corporate-income# (last updated Jan. 
23, 2019). 
 10. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A(a)(1) (as amended in 2009). 
 11. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A(d)(2) (as amended in 2009).  
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determines it is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes.12 Courts have 
stated that the purpose of this provision is to provide an income-
correction device to prevent artificial shifting of income between related 
entities.13 This provision is further explained by the Treasury Regulation 
1.482-1 (“the Regulation”), which gives information about Section 482 
and its implementation.14  
1. The Arm’s Length Standard 
When determining whether an adjustment to income is proper, “the 
Commissioner is empowered to examine closely the transactions 
between controlled taxable entities to determine whether they are such 
as would have been consummated in an arm’s length negotiation 
between strangers and to make an allocation when they fail to meet that 
standard.”15 In making this determination, the Commissioner has broad 
discretion and must evaluate the facts of each individual situation.16 This 
standard is known as the arm’s length standard and is expressly 
mentioned in the Regulation itself as well as used in many tax treaties 
between the U.S. and foreign countries.17 
2. The Commensurate with Income Standard 
The arm’s length standard becomes less effective and more difficult 
to use when dealing with the transfer of intangibles, like stock-based 
compensation, because there is no concrete way to determine the value 
of those intangibles at the time of transfer.18 It is also difficult because 
there are few, if any, similar transactions between unrelated parties.19 
This led to an amendment to the Regulation and the inclusion of the 
commensurate with income standard in Section 482.20 Under this 
standard, “payments with respect to intangibles that a U.S. person 
transfers to a related foreign corporation or possession corporation must 
be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.”21  
 
 12. I.R.C. § 482 (2018). 
 13. Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 270, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see also 
Brittingham v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 14. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (as amended in 2015). 
 15. Local Finance Corp. v. Comm’r, 407 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2015); Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 95-
96 (T.C. 2015).  
 18. H.R. Rept. No. 99-426, at 423-26 (1985). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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To clarify any confusion stemming from the addition of the 
commensurate with income standard, the Treasury and the Internal 
Revenue Service (“the IRS”) published a study in which they concluded 
that the new standard was meant to work alongside the arm’s length 
standard.22 This study further stated that the goal of the commensurate 
with income standard is “to ensure that each party earns the income or 
return from the intangible that an unrelated party would earn in an arm’s 
length transfer of the intangible.”23 
3. Iterations of the Treasury Regulations 
i. 1995 Income Tax Regulations 
The 1995 income tax regulations provided that costs of intangible 
developments would be shared but did not expressly mention stock-
based compensation.24  
ii. Income Tax Regulation 1.482-7A(d)(2) 
In 2003 the Treasury amended the Regulation to include section 
1.482-7A(d)(2) (“the Rule”).25 The Rule explicitly requires the cost of 
stock-based compensation to be shared among related entities 
participating in cost-sharing agreements.26 
III. CASES 
A. Xilinx Inc. v. Commissioner 
In Xilinx Inc. v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit found that under the 
1995 cost-sharing regulations (which did not expressly include stock-
based compensation), companies did not have to share stock-based 
compensation costs because entities operating at an arm’s length would 
not do so.27  
B. Altera Corp. v. Commissioner 
In Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, the court heard a case where Altera Corp. 
 
 22. 1988-49 I.R.B. 7, 1988 IRB LEXIS 3758 at *83-94 (July 1988).  
 23. Id. at *69.  
 24. See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r (Altera I), 145 T.C. 91, 99-101 (T.C. 2015). 
 25. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A(d)(2) (as amended in 2019).  
 26. Id. 
 27. Xilinx Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 37, 62 (T.C. 2005). 
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(“Altera U.S.”) and its Cayman Islands subsidiary, Altera International 
(collectively “Altera”), challenged the Rule as it applied to sharing costs 
associated with stock-based compensation.28 Altera U.S. and Altera 
International had entered into a cost-sharing agreement where they 
agreed to share the risks and costs of research and development for a 
project.29 In tax years 2004 through 2007, Altera International paid 
Altera U.S. a total of $647,784,201 as a part of this cost-sharing 
agreement.30 The amount of cash compensation that Altera U.S. paid to 
employees subject to the cost-sharing agreement was included in the 
cost pool and, therefore, Altera International paid its share of those 
costs.31 However, not included in the cost pool was the amount that 
Altera U.S. paid those employees through stock options or other stock-
based compensation, as required by the Rule.32 The effect of 
withholding these additional costs was that Altera International was 
required to pay Altera U.S. a lower amount, therefore decreasing the 
income of Altera U.S. and reducing the tax liability owed by Altera U.S. 
The Commissioner of the IRS notified Altera of this discrepancy and 
found that Altera International was required to pay Altera U.S. an 
additional $80,393,721 for tax years 2004 through 2007.33 Altera 
petitioned the Tax Court for a determination that the Rule was invalid.34 
1. The Tax Court’s Decision 
To determine whether the Rule was valid, the Tax Court had to first 
understand which standard of review to apply. Under section 706(2)(A) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“the APA”) courts are required to 
set aside rules that the court finds to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”35 In 
determining whether a rule is arbitrary and capricious, courts will apply 
the State Farm test and ask whether the agency “engaged in reasoned 
decisionmaking.”36 The courts have further explained that the reasoned 
decisionmaking standard requires the agency to look at relevant data and 
show that the choice made was rationally connected to the facts found.37 
 
 28. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 92. 
 29. Id. at 93. 
 30. Id. at 94. 
 31. Id. at 93. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 94.  
 34. Id. at 92. 
 35. Id. at 112. 
 36. Id. at 113 (quoting Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 43 (2011). 
 37. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 113; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (2011).  
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The Secretary argued that the court should apply the standard articulated 
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc., but the court 
did not answer the question of which standard applied, finding that the 
Chevron test included the reasoned decisionmaking standard required by 
State Farm.38 Therefore, the crux of the Tax Court’s decision was 
whether the Treasury reasonably concluded that the Rule was consistent 
with the arm’s length standard and used reasoned decisionmaking to 
make that determination. 39 
Altera argued that the Rule was not valid under this standard because 
(1) it lacked a basis in fact, (2) the Treasury’s choice was not rationally 
connected to the facts, (3) the Treasury did not respond to comments, 
and (4) there was evidence contrary to the Rule presented to the 
Treasury.40 
The Tax Court first examined whether the Rule had a basis in fact by 
determining whether it was consistent with the arm’s length standard.41 
Although the Treasury argued that the court should apply the 
commensurate with income standard, the court quickly rejected that 
argument because (1) the commensurate with income standard was 
meant to work with the arm’s length standard and (2) the Treasury did 
not rely exclusively on the commensurate with income standard when 
rationalizing the Rule.42 
The Treasury argued that the Rule is consistent with the arm’s length 
standard because unrelated parties would include stock-based 
compensation costs in a cost-sharing agreement.43 The only evidence the 
Treasury presented to support this contention was its statement in the 
preamble of the Rule which expressed the belief that these expenses 
would be included in an agreement between unrelated parties.44 The 
Treasury submitted no findings of fact and conceded that they were 
unable to find any agreement where unrelated parties agreed to share 
stock-based compensation costs.45 
The court ultimately decided that the Rule had no basis in fact 
because the Treasury did not engage in any fact finding and failed to 
support its conclusion that unrelated parties would share the cost of 
stock-based compensation with any evidence.46 
 
 38. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 120.   
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 122. 
 42. Id. at 121-22.  
 43. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 123. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 122-23.  
 46. Id. at 125. 
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The next attack on the Rule’s validity was that the Treasury failed to 
rationally connect its decision to adopt the Rule with the facts on which 
it relied.47 The Treasury noted in the preamble of the Rule that the 
decision was based on the belief that cost-sharing agreements dealing 
with the development of high-profit intangibles would include stock-
based compensation if those costs were a significant element of 
employee compensation.48 However, the Treasury also failed to refute 
the fact that many cost-sharing agreements do not deal with high-profit 
intangibles and that stock-based compensation is not frequently a 
significant element of compensation.49 The Treasury attempted to 
defend the fact that the Rule did not distinguish these types of 
agreements by stating that the general rule eased administrative 
burden.50 The court did not find the Treasury’s argument persuasive and 
decided that the failure to differentiate between cost-sharing agreements 
showed the Treasury did not rationally connect its choice to the facts it 
relied on.51 
The Tax Court was also required to determine whether the Rule was a 
legislative rule or an interpretive rule because different administrative 
requirements apply to each.52 Interpretive rules generally explain a law 
that already exists while legislative rules create a right or obligation and 
have force of law.53 To have the force of law, Congress must have 
delegated legislative power to the agency and the agency must have 
intended to exercise that power.54 The agency’s intent for a rule to carry 
the force of law can be inferred if the rule is the only adequate basis for 
enforcement action or the agency has invoked its general rulemaking 
authority.55 
Under section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the Secretary is 
able to create rules and regulations to enforce the Internal Revenue 
Code, and such rules and regulations carry the force of law.56 The court 
therefore concluded that “Congress has delegated legislative power to 
the Treasury.”57 The court further concluded that the Rule was a 
legislative rule because it was required to adjust the payments made by 
 
 47. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 125. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 125-26. 
 51. Id. at 126-27. 
 52. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 115. 
 53. Id. at 111. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 116.  
 57. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 116 (quoting American Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 
995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).  
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Altera International to Altera U.S., and the Treasury had invoked its 
general rulemaking authority to promulgate the Rule.58 Finding that the 
Rule is a legislative one is important because the Treasury must comply 
with additional requirements imposed by section 553 of the APA.59 
When creating legislative rules an agency must: 
 
(1) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register; (2) provide “interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, 
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral 
presentation”; and (3) “[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter 
presented, . . . incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general 
statement of their basis and purpose.”60 
 
The court explained that this requirement was to assist in judicial review 
and to provide fairness to those affected by the Rule.61 The court further 
stated that to comply with the regulation, the Treasury was required to 
respond to significant comments—failure to do so could be evidence 
that the decision was not based on a consideration of the facts.62 
Therefore, the court, as a part of its decision, was required to determine 
whether the Treasury had complied with the requirements of section 553 
of the APA.63  
The court concluded that the Treasury had failed to “meaningfully 
respond to numerous relevant and significant comments.”64 In making 
this determination the court examined the evidence that the Treasury 
received from commenters such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Deloitte, Baker & McKenzie, American Electronics Association, and 
others.65 These commenters submitted evidence which suggested cost-
sharing agreements between unrelated parties rarely included stock-
based compensation and that unrelated parties would not be willing to 
share such costs due the uncertainty of the value.66 In its response, the 
Treasury simply claimed that the agreements which the commenters 
were referencing were not similar enough to the agreements which were 
governed by the Rule in question.67 The Treasury failed to provide any 
 
 58. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 116. 
 59. Id. at 111. 
 60. Id. at 111. 
 61. Id. at 112.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 117. 
 64. Id. at 130.  
 65. Id. at 104-06, 127-28. 
 66. Id. at 129.  
 67. Id. at 130. 
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analysis on this assertion and did not explain why the differences made 
the commenters points irrelevant.68 
Finally, the court found that the Rule was contrary to the evidence 
before the Treasury.69 In coming to this determination the court stated 
that: (1) the Treasury failed to give any evidence supporting its position, 
(2) there was a substantial amount of evidence that was counter to the 
Treasury’s position, and (3) the Treasury failed to respond to most of the 
submitted evidence.70 
After reviewing the facts and arguments on both sides, the court 
found the Rule was invalid.71 The court explained that the Treasury’s 
decision failed to comply with the reasoned decisionmaking standard set 
forth in State Farm and went so far as to say that the decision 
“epitomizes arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking.”72  
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Reversal 
On appeal, the Commissioner argued that the allocation of stock-
based compensation costs was proper because it was consistent with the 
arm’s length standard.73 The Commissioner reasoned that, because there 
were no equivalent uncontrolled arrangements, the commensurate with 
income method could be used to allocate costs and create an arm’s 
length result.74 Altera refuted the notion that the arm’s length standard 
required anything other than a comparability analysis.75 Altera therefore 
claimed that, because unrelated taxpayers would not share stock-based 
compensation costs, the Commissioner could not require them to share 
those costs.76 In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found for the Commissioner, reversing the Tax Court’s opinion and 
holding that the Rule properly included stock-based compensation in 
qualified cost sharing agreements.77  
i. Majority 
The Majority took a different approach than the Tax Court and first 
 
 68. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 130. 
 69. Id. at 131. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 133. 
 72. Id. at 134 (quoting Ill. Pub. Telecoms. Ass’n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
 73. Altera Corp. v Comm’r (Altera II), Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 
at *7-8 (9th Cir. July 24, 2018). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 7.   
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at *4.  
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/6
2019] ALTERA CORP. V. COMMISSIONER AND TRANSFER PRICING 1133 
examined which standard to use and then determined whether the 
Treasury’s interpretation of the statute was permissible. 
ii. Which standard of review applies? 
According to the Majority, if the Treasury complied with the APA 
when creating the Rule, the deferential standard from Chevron would 
apply.78 Therefore, the court first determined whether the Treasury 
complied with the APA when enacting the Rule.79 
The APA sets forth a rulemaking procedure for agencies and requires, 
among other things, that they “consider and respond to significant 
comments received during the period for public comment.”80 This 
requirement, along with others, ensures that the agency’s decision was 
not arbitrary and capricious.81 The court examined whether the 
Treasury’s decision was arbitrary and capricious in light of the reasoned 
decisionmaking standard set forth in State Farm.82 This standard asks 
the court to determine whether the agency’s decision can be rationally 
connected to the facts it found and requires the agency’s path to be 
reasonable discernable.83  
Altera argues that the Treasury failed to satisfy this standard by 
dismissing comments it received which attacked the Rule for failure to 
comply with the arm’s length standard and gave evidence that unrelated 
parties would not share stock based compensation costs.84 The court 
dismissed this argument by explaining that the Treasury had in fact not 
relied on the traditional arm’s length standard but had instead used the 
commensurate with income standard.85 In the court’s view, the Treasury 
had given sufficient explanation of its position that the legislative 
history did not require a comparability analysis and therefore was 
correct to dismiss the comments.86 The disagreement between the 
commenters and the Treasury regarding which interpretation of the Rule 
was correct had no bearing on the effectiveness of the rulemaking 
process.87 Rather, the court explained that this disagreement would be 
 
 78. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524, at *28-29. 
 79. Id. at *29. 
 80. Id. at *29 (quoting Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1203 (2014)); see also 
5 U.S.C.A § 553(c) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-281).  
 81. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-281).   
 82. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *30-31; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (2011). 
 83. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 at 42-44. 
 84. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *31-32. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at *32-33. 
 87. Id. at *35. 
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“properly addressed in the Chevron analysis.”88  
The court concluded that there was no APA violation because the 
Treasury’s “path could reasonably be discerned”—the Treasury had 
given adequate notice of its position that a comparability analysis was 
not required, had considered the comments submitted, and was justified 
in rejecting those comments as they had “no bearing on the relevant 
factors to the rulemaking.”89  
Altera also argued that abandoning the comparability analysis is a 
major shift in administrative policy and requires careful consideration 
and broadcasting of the decision under FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc.90 The court disagreed, finding that the Treasury was not changing a 
policy, but was clarifying that the existing policy did not require a 
comparability analysis.91 Again, the Majority explained that whether 
this interpretation was permissible would be property addressed under 
the Chevron analysis and did not lead to a violation of the APA.92  
The court therefore concluded that the Rule was not arbitrary and 
capricious and complied with the APA.93  
iii. Deference under Chevron 
After determining that the rulemaking process satisfied the 
requirements under State Farm, the court then examined the Treasury’s 
interpretation of the statute using the Chevron analysis.94 Chevron 
requires the court to determine whether Congress has spoken to the issue 
and, if not, asks the court to give deference to an agencies interpretation 
as long as it is not arbitrary and capricious.95 
The court found that Section 482 does not speak to whether the 
Commissioner can require parties to share stock-based compensation 
costs.96 The court further stated that Congress meant to ensure flexibility 
in the Treasury’s ability to allocate costs to prevent the avoidance of tax 
liability.97  
After determining that Congress had not spoken on this issue, the 
court took a deferential approach to determine whether the Treasury’s 
 
 88. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *35. 
 89. Id. at **35-36.  
 90. Id. at *39-40; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 91. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *40-41. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at *41. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at *41-42. 
 96. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *43. 
 97. Id. 
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interpretation was permissible.98 The court looked to the purpose of 
Section 482, which they found to be parity among taxpayers, to 
determine if the interpretation was permissible.99 According to the court, 
the commensurate with income standard in the 1986 amendment was 
added because the traditional arm’s length standard was not fulfilling 
this purpose of parity.100 The Majority examined House and Conference 
reports associated with the 1986 amendment to determine that the 
commensurate with income standard was meant to be “purely internal” 
and therefore abandoning the comparability analysis was not 
unreasonable.101 The Majority further gleaned from these reports that an 
arm’s length transfer of intangibles between unrelated parties may not 
be relevant to the allocation of income, and that the Treasury’s decision 
to dismiss comments which provided evidence of such transactions was 
proper.102 The court concluded that the Treasury’s interpretation of the 
Rule was not arbitrary and capricious and was permissible under the 
deferential Chevron review.103  
iv. Altera’s Argument 
Altera continued to argue that the commensurate with income 
standard did not change the arm’s length standard or do away with the 
requirement of a comparability analysis.104 Altera supported this 
argument by claiming that the court was imposing an “amendment by 
implication.”105 The court was not persuaded with this argument 
because the legislative history and the amendment clearly show a 
change in the meaning of the statute.106 Furthermore, under Altera’s 
understanding, the commensurate with income standard would be 
virtually useless because the arm’s length standard would always be 
required.107  
Finally, Altera argued that the Rule is improper under Xilinx.108 The 
court disagreed, finding that Xilinx did not control in this case because 
 
 98. Id. at *42-43. 
 99. Id. at 44. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at 44; see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-426 at 423-35 
(1985); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841 at II-637-38 (1985).  
 102. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *45-47; see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-426 at 423-25 
(1985).  
 103. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *44-47. 
 104. Id. at *47-48. 
 105. Id. at *48. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *50. 
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(1) it did not deal with administrative authority and did not mention the 
commensurate with income standard, and (2) it dealt with a conflict of 
two rules while this case does not.109 
v. Dissent 
Judge O’Malley, in her dissent, took a different view of the 
relationship between the commensurate with income and the arm’s 
length standards.  
Judge O’Malley agreed with the Majority that the purpose of Section 
482 was parity among taxpayers.110 O’Malley opined that this purpose 
was served by the arm’s length standard which requires an examination 
of how uncontrolled taxpayers interact.111 The commensurate with 
income standard, she added, did not supplant the arm’s length standard 
which was to be used in any case in which comparable transactions 
exist.112 
Judge O’Malley then turned to the treatment of stock-based 
compensation in previous iterations of the cost sharing regulations.113 In 
particular, the 1994 and 1995 regulations included a provision known as 
the “all costs” provision, which required all costs associated with 
intangible development to be shared.114 The Tax Court in Xilinx found 
this to include stock-based compensation, which they found to be 
inconsistent with the arm’s length standard.115 The Commissioner in that 
case never appealed this finding in Xilinx and, on appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit “assumed that sharing expenses related to stock-based 
compensation would be inconsistent with the arm’s length standard.”116 
Turning to the regulation at issue in this case, O’Malley first 
examined the Treasury’s position in promulgating the rule and in 
responding to comments.117 The Treasury’s position throughout the 
process was that requiring stock-based compensation costs to be shared 
was in fact consistent with the arm’s length standard.118 The Treasury 
did not attempt to argue that the commensurate with income standard 
 
 109. Id. at *50-52. 
 110. Id. at *55. (O’Malley, dissenting).  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *55-56. 
 113. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *57 (O’Malley, dissenting). 
 114. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2015). 
 115. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *57-59 (O’Malley, dissenting); Xilinx, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 125 T.C. 37, 53 (T.C. 2005).  
 116. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *58 (O’Malley, dissenting) (quoting Xilinx 598 
F.3d at 1194).  
 117. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *63-66 (O’Malley, dissenting). 
 118. Id. 
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was anything other than consistent with the arm’s length standard and 
noted that comparable transactions would be relevant to this issue.119 
The Treasury simply stated that there were no comparable transactions 
and that parties dealing at an arm’s length would include stock-based 
compensation costs in a cost sharing agreement.120 The Tax Court was 
not persuaded by this position and found the Rule arbitrary and 
capricious.121 
In Judge O’Malley’s view, that the Commissioner did not refute the 
Tax Court’s holding but instead changed its position to argue that the 
arm’s length standard, did not require a comparability analysis.122 While 
the Majority accepted this move from the traditional arm’s length 
standard, Judge O’Malley did not.123 Judge O’Malley opined that Xilinx 
clearly requires a comparability analysis to satisfy the arm’s length 
standard and found that the Treasury made no indication of a change 
from this standard when promulgating the Rule.124 Judge O’Malley 
therefore found the regulations were invalid under State Farm because 
the Treasury did not give the public notice of its intention to dispose of 
the traditional arm’s length standard and did not respond to the Tax 
Court’s findings that the Treasury failed to provide a reasoned basis for 
believing that unrelated parties would not share these costs.125 
3. Ninth Circuit Withdraws Opinion 
After the death of Judge Reinhardt, who sided with the majority in 
Altera II, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion to allow for time to 
confer with the new panel.126 Many tax practitioners and business-
people are now eagerly waiting to find out if the Ninth Circuit will, 
under a new panel, make the same determination that it did in Altera II, 
or if they will find that the Tax Court was correct and hold the 
allocations made by the Treasury as invalid.  
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.at *67-67. 
 122. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *67-68 (O’Malley, dissenting). 
 123. Id. at *68-69. 
 124. Id. at *69-70. 
 125. Id. at *71-72. 
 126. Id. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
A. The Department of the Treasury failed to comply with the APA’s 
rulemaking requirements 
The initial issue in Altera is whether the Treasury complied with the 
APA when promulgating Regulation 1.482-7A(d)(2) (“the Rule”), 
which requires the cost of stock-based compensation to be shared among 
related entities participating in cost-sharing agreements.127 
The APA sets out guidelines for administrative rule making and 
requires “notice of the proposed rule-making, an opportunity for 
interested persons to comment, and ‘a concise general statement of the 
basis and purpose’ of the rules ultimately adopted.”128 The purpose of 
these guidelines is, in part, to “provide fair treatment for persons 
affected by the rule.”129 The Tax Court and Ninth Circuit disagreed 
regarding whether the Treasury adequately gave notice of its intention to 
move away from the traditional arm’s length standard.130 The Tax Court 
found that although the Treasury mentioned the commensurate with 
income standard in the Rule, the arm’s length standard was also 
mentioned and the Treasury showed no intent to move away from the 
traditional arm’s length approach.131 The Tax Court relied on language 
in the preamble to the Rule, which gave the Treasury’s opinion that 
unrelated parties would in fact share stock based compensation.132 As 
the Tax Court found, this was a clear reference to a comparability 
analysis and would lead affected parties to believe the traditional arm’s 
length standard was still an integral part of allocating income.133  
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that “Treasury communicated its 
understanding that Congress had called upon it to move away from the 
traditional arm’s length standard.”134 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
Treasury had sufficiently shown its intent to rely on the commensurate 
with income standard and had provided enough legislative history to 
justify its decision.135 The Ninth Circuit also cited the preamble to the 
Rule, which gave the Treasury’s opinion that the commensurate with 
income standard was consistent with the arm’s length standard and that 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting 5 U.S.C.A § 
553(b)-(c) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-281)).  
 129. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 35.  
 130. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *30; Altera I, 145 T.C. at 133.  
 131. Altera I, 145 T.C. at 121-22.  
 132. Id. at 109. 
 133. Id. at 121-22. 
 134. Altera II, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 at *34. 
 135. Id. at *31-32. 
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a lack of evidence showing uncontrolled parties would share stock-
based compensation costs was insufficient to claim the Rule did not 
comport with the arm’s length standard.136 The Ninth Circuit 
conveniently omitted the latter half of the preamble which discussed in 
detail how unrelated parties would in fact share stock-based 
compensation costs.137 It is clear that the Treasury was relying, in part, 
on the commensurate with income standard. It is equally as clear, given 
the reference to how unrelated parties would engage in similar 
transactions, that a comparability analysis was meant to be a key point 
of the allocation of income under the Rule. This leads to a conclusion 
that the Treasury intended for the commensurate with income standard 
to work with the traditional arm’s length standard and was not meant to 
supplant a comparability analysis. This is the position taken by Altera 
and is one that is clearly supported by the preamble to the Rule.138  
Given that the Treasury gave no notice of its intentions to abandon a 
comparability analysis, the Treasury did not comply with the APA 
requirements when promulgating the Rule.139 Altera further argues that, 
even if the Treasury complied with the APA, it does not have the 
authority to remove a comparability analysis from Section 482 
allocations.  
B. Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code requires the use of a 
comparability analysis  
The tax implications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Altera are 
significant. The court essentially determined that the Commissioner can 
allocate income between related parties based on a purely internal 
standard without regard to comparable transactions between unrelated 
parties.140 This was substantially different than the Tax Court’s opinion, 
which found comparable transactions between unrelated parties were 
relevant in its determination that the Rule was invalid.141 This 
disagreement regarding whether a comparability analysis is required to 
allocate income is the most significant point at issue in Altera. The 
Ninth Circuit showed as much at rehearing by spending most of the time 
at oral argument on this issue.142  
 
 136. Id. at *32-34. 
 137. Id.; see also 2003 IRB LEXIS 1858 at 10-12 (showing the full preamble).  
 138. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.  
 139. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.  
 141. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
 142. Oral Argument, Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, (No. 16-70496) (available at 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/).  
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The Commissioner’s position is that although the arm’s length 
standard must be applied, it does not necessarily require a comparability 
analysis. In fact, at oral argument, council for the Commissioner stated 
that even if there were allegedly comparable transactions, those 
transactions would not be comparable for purposes of income allocation 
if they did not comport with the commensurate with income 
requirement.143 In contrast, Altera argues that this interpretation of the 
arm’s length standard would completely do away with comparability 
analyses.144 Altera’s position is that Section 482 first requires a 
comparability analysis under the arm’s length standard and then, if 
necessary, allows for periodic adjustments so that the transaction 
comports with the commensurate with income standard. This method, 
according to Altera, is the only way the arm’s length standard and 
commensurate with income standard can work together.  
As the opinions of both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit illustrate, 
determining which view is proper requires a consideration of the 
purpose of Section 482 and an examination of the legislative history. 
The parties agree that the purpose of Section 482 is parity but disagree 
regarding how that purpose must or may be fulfilled. The Supreme 
Court noted in Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank that the purpose of 
Section 482 was to “place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer” and that “the standard to be applied in every case 
is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer.”145 This language, which has 
remained largely unchanged, was interpreted to mean that “some 
evidence of similar business activities between uncontrolled taxpayers 
must be adduced.”146  
Before the additional of the commensurate with income standard in 
the 1986 amendment, it was widely agreed upon that the allocation of 
income under Section 482 indeed required a comparability analysis. 
Taxpayers at that time had argued that, because there was no mention of 
the arm’s length standard in Section 482, the true test should be “what 
income properly is attributable to each of the two commonly held 
corporations as its true net income in light of what each performs or 
produces.”147 The Ninth Circuit at the time disagreed, finding that the 
proper test is a determination of what income would have resulted “had 
the dealings been at arm’s length between unrelated parties.”148 To be 
 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Comm’r v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 400 (1972) (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(b)(1) (as amended in 2015)).  
 146. Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Comm’r, 468 F.2d 805, 808 (5th Cir. 1972).  
 147. Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1966) 
 148. Id.   
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sure, in Frank v. International Canadian Corp., the Ninth Circuit had 
opined that the arm’s length standard was not necessarily the sole 
criterion to be used, but shortly thereafter conditioned this view by 
stating that it was “under the facts of that case, very narrowly 
limited.”149 Other courts gave little credence to the holding in Frank, 
finding that “even if the arm’s length standard is not the sole criterion, it 
is certainly the most significant yardstick.”150 A myriad of other cases 
before the 1986 Amendment show an understanding that a 
comparability analysis was the primary tool for allocating income.151  
In 1986 the commensurate with income requirement was added to 
Section 482. The Treasury put forth an argument that this new standard 
was meant to displace the traditional comparability analysis required by 
the arm’s length standard. While its argument is not completely without 
merit, it neglects significant evidence that a comparability analysis was 
meant to remain the cornerstone of Section 482. The House Report 
accompanying the 1986 amendment made it clear that the “effectiveness 
of the arm’s length approach” was under scrutiny with regard to the 
transfer of intangibles due to the “absence of comparable arm’s length 
transactions between unrelated parties, and the inconsistent results of 
attempting to impose an arm’s length concept in the absence of 
comparable.”152 However, the IRS promptly issued a notice, now known 
as the White Paper, which “present[ed] the findings and 
recommendations of the [Internal Revenue] Service and Treasury.”153 
The White Paper stated that, although the commensurate with income 
standard requires adjustments to reflect changes in income, “transfer 
prices must be determined on the basis of true comparables if they in 
fact exist.”154 The White Paper went on to state that the commensurate 
with income standard was consistent with the arm’s length standard 
because it “requires that each entity calculate its profits separately and 
that related party transactions be priced as if unrelated parties had 
entered into them.”155 The notice expressly included a comparability 
analysis within the commensurate with income standard by stating that 
the “goal of the commensurate with income standard is, therefore, to 
ensure that each party earns the income or return form the intangible that 
 
 149. Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d 520, 528-29 (9th Cir. 1962); Oil Base, 362 
F.2d at 214. 
 150. Eli Lily & Co., v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
 151. See Local Finance Corp. v. Comm’r, 407 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1969); Lufkin Foundry, 468 
F.2d at 808; United Steel Corp. v. Comm’r, 617 F.2d 942, 947 (2nd Cir. 1980); Van Dale Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 59 T.C. 390, 397-98 (T.C. 1972).  
 152. H.R. Rep. No. 99-426 at 423-26 (1985).  
 153. Notice 88-123, 1988 IRB LEXIS 3758 at *1-2. 
 154. Id. at *2.  
 155. Id. at *92.  
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an unrelated party would earn in an arm’s length transfer of the 
intangible.”156  
The view that an allocation under Section 482 requires an analysis of 
comparable transactions has been maintained through recent years. In 
2015 the IRS reiterated that the arm’s length standard is satisfied if “the 
results of the transaction are consistent with the results that would have 
been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same 
transaction under the same circumstances.”157 The notice went on to 
state that the commensurate with income standard could be used to 
ensure an arm’s length result through periodic adjustments.158 The 
regulations governing Section 482 show that a comparability analysis is 
key to the arm’s length standard. The regulations provide various 
methods of determining arm’s length results for different categories of 
transactions.159 In determining which method to use, the regulations are 
clear that one of two relevant factors is “the degree of comparability 
between the controlled transaction and any uncontrolled 
comparables.”160 The regulations go on to say that when there are 
“material differences between the controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions,” adjustments can be made based on “commercial practices, 
economic principles, or statistical analysis.”161 This language shows a 
strong desire to require comparability analyses before allocating income, 
even when exact comparables do not exist.  
Because is it clear that the arm’s length standard (which was not 
supplanted by the commensurate with income standard) is intended to be 
based on a comparability analysis, the Ninth Circuit’s Majority opinion 
in Altera was wrong to allow the Treasury to abandon this standard, 
especially without giving notice to the taxpayers affected.  
Apart from the consequences in the present case, this decision will 
have significant ramifications for companies in the Ninth Circuit which 
are parties to cost sharing agreements.162 Similar to Altera U.S., some of 
these companies have been excluding stock-based compensation from 
their cost sharing agreements, meaning they could be facing significant 
 
 156. Id. at *69. 
 157. 2015 IRB LEXIS 335 at *8-9.  
 158. Id. at *12-13.  
 159. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(2) (as amended 2015); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A (as 
amended 2013) (providing the methods applicable to cost sharing agreements).  
 160. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2) (as amended 2015).  
 161. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2) (as amended 2015).  
 162. Ninth Circuit reverses Tax Court in ‘Altera,’ requires stock-based compensation to be 
covered by cost sharing payments, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS’ TAX INSIGHTS FROM TRANSFER 
PRICING (July 27, 2018), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/pricing-knowledge-
network/assets/pwc-tp-altera-ninth-cir-dec.pdf.  
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tax consequences as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.163 The 
decision could significantly affect other areas of transfer pricing as well. 
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the traditional arm’s length standard 
allows the Treasury to make allocations based on “a hypothetical 
inquiry” without providing any real evidence to support its claim.164 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite evidence that the Treasury intended to include a 
comparability analysis as a part of the Rule, the Ninth Circuit 
improperly found that they had given sufficient notice of their intentions 
to move away from the traditional arm’s length standard.165 The Tax 
Court was correct to find that Treasury did not rely entirely on the 
commensurate with income standard and that the Treasury failed to 
support its position that sharing stock-based compensation was 
consistent with the traditional arm’s length standard.166 Furthermore, 
even assuming that Treasury did in fact comply with the APA, the Ninth 
Circuit was incorrect to allow Treasury to abandon a comparability 
analysis which remains an integral part of allocations made under 
Section 482.167 The Ninth Circuit ignored a deep history, both 
legislative and judicial, showing that the commensurate with income 
standard was not meant to replace a comparability analysis.168 The Ninth 
Circuit withdrew its opinion and should use the opportunity to 
reconsider its position. The Ninth Circuit should concur with the Tax 
Court in finding that the Treasury did not satisfy the APA’s rulemaking 
requirements and that a comparability analysis is required under the 
arm’s length standard. 
 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text.  
 166. See supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 140-162 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 140-162 and accompanying text. 
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